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Introduction
Tax systems of developed countries contain 
provisions that give a preferred status to 
housing and homeownership. A signifi cant 
relief is provided especially by the combination 
of non-taxation of imputed rental income and 
mortgage interest payment deductibility. Real 
user costs of owner-occupied housing are 
reduced (see Poterba & Sinai, 2008) and thus 
a bias in favour of the homeownership is created 
when households are encouraged to buy rather 
than to rent their dwellings. Although there is 
a property tax, that is levied to tax the imputed 
rent, the relief for the mortgage interest payment 
can be so generous that it mitigates the effect 
of the property tax (Crowe, Dell’Ariccia, Igan, 
& Rabanal, 2011). The fact is that the property 
tax in many countries is not high enough to be 
a perfect substitute for the imputed rent taxation 
(Hemmelgarn & Nicodéme, 2010). Furthermore, 
homeownership is more attractive when capital 
gains are not taxed in a neutral manner. And 
profi ts from home sales are not usually taxed. 
The housing-related tax allowances are one of 
main tax expenditure items in EU countries (see 
European Communities [EC], 2013).
The pro-homeownership tax policy is 
justifi ed by market failures and a desire to 
enhance housing opportunities available 
to citizens (Andrews, Caldera Sánchez, & 
Johansson, 2011). However it seems that for 
the time being economists rather conclude that 
the tax advantages provided to homeowners 
are not very effi cient at achieving given 
objectives. A general goal in practice is to boost 
the homeownership or to increase housing 
demand and consumption. Cecchetti, Mohanty, 
and Zampolli (2011) claim that the generous tax 
relief for mortgage interest payment could have 
played a role in expanding the homeownership 
in some countries. However according to 
Andrews, Caldera Sánchez, and Johansson 
(2011) there is no clear cross-country 
relationship between the extent of the mortgage 
interest deductibility and the homeownership 
rates. Nevertheless they admit that households’ 
preference for the homeownership can be 
infl uenced also by tax policy. Bourassa and 
Grigsby (2000) or Glaeser and Shapiro (2002), 
based on empirical evidence on U.S. situation, 
concluded that impact of the mortgage interest 
deductibility on the homeownership rate was 
minimal. And Crowe et al. (2011) even assert 
that the homeownership rates are negatively 
related to the extent of the advantageous tax 
treatment of homeownership.
An argument in favour of a higher rate of 
the homeownership is existence of positive 
externalities, e. g. enjoyment of neighbours 
and passersby generating through home 
maintenance and gardening, better outcomes 
for children, and long-term prospects of 
a community (Bourassa & Grigsby, 2000 or 
Glaeser & Shapiro, 2002). Glaeser and Shapiro 
(2002) think that evidence on externalities is 
weak but suggestive. But Hilber and Turner 
(2013) believe that the homeownership 
generate few or no positive externalities. 
Moreover, there could be negative externalities 
related to housing consumption, e. g. leaving 
small city apartments for larger places on 
the fringe of a city, increasing segregation by 
income or envy incited by fancy homes (Glaeser 
& Shapiro, 2002). A lower labour mobility 
and higher unemployment among owner-
occupants in comparison with the mobility 
and unemployment of renters can be harmful 
effect of the homeownership as well (Andrews, 
Caldera Sánchez, & Johansson, 2011). Finally, 
the homeowners could utilize their political 
power to cut off new house construction in 
order to raise their house prices (Glaeser & 
Shapiro, 2002). As O’Sullivan and Gibb (2012) 
summed it up, the homeownership does not 
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generate economic benefi ts for the macro-
economy or specifi c households which would 
justify a general programme of tax concessions 
to homeowners.
As an argument supporting the owner-
occupation we could present that accumulated 
housing wealth could serve as means of private 
insurance (Ansell, 2013) or that home equity 
could provide an additional source of retirement 
income beyond pensions, i.e. reverse 
mortgages (Toussaint, 2013). However we are 
not familiar so far with any evidence that the 
owner-occupation serves well as an instrument 
of pension security. On the other hand, what is 
already a subject of examination is correlation 
between the mortgage interest deductibility 
and growth of house prices or increased house 
prices volatility. Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development [OECD] (2009) or 
Andrews, Caldera Sánchez, and Johansson 
(2011) offer some evidence of a positive 
correlation between the tax relief on mortgage 
interest and variability in house prices. Keen, 
Klemm, and Perry (2010), André (2010), 
Sutherland, Hoeller, Merola and Ziemann 
(2012) or further authors point out that the tax 
subsidy is likely, depending on a price elasticity 
of housing supply, to be capitalised into house 
prices. In addition the tax incentive for debt-
fi nancing over other sources of fi nancing of 
own dwellings could result in overinvestment 
in housing and misallocation of capital stock 
with negative effects on a long-term economic 
growth (see e.g. Saarimaa, 2009; André, 2010; 
Hemmelgarn & Nicodéme, 2010; Ventry, 2010). 
Finally, there is agreement among authors 
that the housing tax relief is regressive, i.e. 
it favours rich households. Higher-income 
households benefi t from the advantageous tax 
treatment of housing, namely from the mortgage 
interest deductibility, more than lower-income 
households because they have higher rates of 
the homeownership, they buy more expensive 
houses, and their marginal tax rates are higher 
(see Bourassa & Grigsby, 2000; André, 2010; 
Keen, Klemm, & Perry, 2010; Matsaganis, 2014; 
Ventry, 2010; Andrews, Caldera Sánchez, & 
Johansson, 2011).
There is another important reason why 
the housing taxation, especially the mortgage 
interest deductibility, attract attention of 
economists. It is because it might support 
debt creation. Jorda, Schularick, and Taylor 
(2014) found that household leverage ratios 
have increased substantially in many countries 
over the 20th century: about two thirds of 
bank lending today consists of the loans to 
the household sector for the purchase of real 
estate, according to European Central Bank 
[ECB] (2014) the majority of the European 
household borrowing is comprised by loans for 
house purchase. Furthermore they showed that 
contemporary business cycles are increasingly 
shaped by the dynamics of the mortgage 
credit and that the mortgage credit became 
a specifi c source of fi nancial instability in 
advanced economies after the Second World 
War. And Jorda, Schularick, and Taylor (2015) 
demonstrated that the credit-fi nanced housing 
price bubbles are more dangerous for fi nancial 
sector and real economy than the unleveraged 
bubbles. How indebtedness can affect 
macroeconomic performance and households, 
see Sutherland et al. (2012) or McGowan 
(2013). The household indebtedness impact on 
economic growth have been analysed by Izák 
(2012).
A question raises whether the housing 
taxation, and the presupposed debt bias 
embedded in it, does affect the household 
indebtedness, and whether the negative 
consequences of high levels of debt could 
be, partly, extra cost of the taxation favouring 
housing. Hemmelgarn and Nicodéme (2010), 
Keen, Klemm, and Perry (2010), Bernardi 
(2011), Cecchetti, Mohanty, and Zampolli 
(2011), Hemmelgarn, Nicodéme, and Zangari 
(2011), Sutherland et al. (2012) or Garnier et al. 
(2013) suggest that the tax treatment of owner-
occupied housing may have played a role. 
Households have been probably encouraged 
by the mortgage interest relief to prefer 
borrowing. As a result the household debt may 
be higher than it would be otherwise. Wolswijk’s 
(2005) simple graphical analysis shows that the 
lower the fi nancing costs, decreased by the tax 
subsidy, the higher the debt-GDP ratio. Keen, 
Klemm, and Perry (2010) affi rm that countries 
offering more favourable tax treatment for the 
homeownership have higher ratios of mortgage 
debt. On the other hand Crowe et al. (2011) 
do not see a signifi cant relation between the 
tax treatment of housing and the ratio of the 
mortgage debt to GDP. It is necessary to be 
careful, e.g. Ellis (2006, p. 11) warns that it is 
not easy to prove the correlation between the 
tax advantages for the homeownership and the 
household debt since “the tax regime interacts 
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with other aspects of the housing-fi nance 
system in sometimes complex ways”. OECD 
(2009) points out that home-equity loans and 
real house prices have risen in many countries 
despite the fact that tax incentives varied 
considerably. It suggests that other factors 
affect these phenomenons. However OECD 
(2009) also admits that the high tax relief on 
mortgage interest correlates with the high 
variability in house prices which can lead to 
serious household credit problems.
Deeper insight into the relationship between 
the tax incentive and household debt can be 
provided by studies concerning individual 
countries. Dunsky and Follain (2000) or Munroe 
(2014) analysed the United States data and 
found out that the demand for home mortgage 
debt responded to the mortgage interest 
deduction. Hendershott, Pryce, and White 
(2002) revealed that the homeowner leverage 
in the United Kingdom was sensitive to the 
deductibility of mortgage interest. Alan and Leth-
Petersen (2006) examined the 1987 tax reform 
in Denmark which made the holding of debt less 
attractive. Rouwendal (2007) identifi ed the tax 
incentive for fi nancing the homeownership with 
a mortgage as important driving force behind 
the increase in frequency of mortgage use in 
the Netherlands. According to Sommervoll 
(2007) Norwegian households reduced their 
debt as a response to less generous interest 
deductions after the tax reform. Finally, 
Saarimaa’s (2009) results from the study of the 
impact of the tax reform in Finland indicate that 
high income households with high marginal tax 
rates responded to the tax incentive reduction 
by clearly decreasing their mortgage borrowing. 
On the other hand Jappelli and Pistaferri (2004) 
found no evidence that the tax treatment 
shaped the demand for mortgage debt in Italy. 
It is possible to sum up that tax reforms, that 
reduced value of the mortgage interest relief 
(which is affected also by a marginal tax rate) 
and thus weakened the incentive to borrow 
in order to own home, mostly led to lower 
household leverage. This could prove the 
role of the tax incentive favouring the debt-
fi nanced homeownership (see the European 
Commission taxation papers about tax reforms 
published in 2011-2014). After all, the European 
Commission recommends to the EU Member 
States to reduce the debt bias in their housing 
taxation and subsequently maps changes in 
taxation rules in the member countries, see e.g. 
(EC, 2014). Garnier et al. (2013) confi rm that 
major changes in the housing taxation in many 
countries concerned the debt bias and focused 
on limiting the deductibility of mortgage interest. 
Nevertheless Sommervoll (2007) points out 
that effects of tax reforms on housing markets 
can be offset by other factors in the economy.
Of course, the housing taxation is not 
the only factor infl uencing the household 
demand for mortgage. Interest rates, fi nancing 
conditions (i.e. fi nancial deregulation and 
innovation on fi nancial market), income and 
demography have been identifi ed in both 
theoretical and empirical studies as important 
determinants of the household indebtedness. 
In addition, factors characterising housing 
market, especially house prices, should be 
taken into consideration, too – see e.g. Debelle 
(2004), Jacobsen and Naug (2004), Girouard, 
Kennedy, and André (2006), Dynan and Kohn 
(2007), ECB (2009), André (2010) or Bokhari, 
Torous, and Wheaton (2013).
Aim of our research was to explore whether 
there is the relation between the income tax 
incentive for homeowners, i.e. the mortgage 
interest deductibility and exempted imputed 
rent income, and the household indebtedness. 
To the contrary to studies mentioned above, 
which analysed microdata, we conducted 
a cross-country study like Wolswijk (2005) 
who analysed impact of the housing taxation 
on the mortgage debt growth in EU countries 
on assumption that the taxation may have 
a potentially large role in affecting the household 
leverage. The remainder of the paper is divided 
into three sections and a conclusion. In the next 
section we focus on the construction of our 
key explanatory variable representing the tax 
treatment of the owner-occupied housing which 
is supposed to be debt encouraging. Then we 
describe briefl y the other explanatory variables 
we worked with. The econometric methods we 
used are discussed in section 2 and section 3 
reports results.
1. Variables Used in the Household 
Mortgage Leverage Regression 
Model
We followed Wolswijk’s (2005) work in our 
research. Wolswijk applied a multiple (panel) 
regression analysis in order to measure the 
effect of the fi scal instruments on the mortgage 
debt growth in the EU countries. We also 
employed the regression analysis where 
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the dependent variable was the household 
mortgage leverage. The mortgage leverage 
was measured by the ratio of total outstanding 
residential loans (on lender’s books at the 
end of the year, in EUR million) to household 
gross disposable income (in EUR million). The 
data on both loans and income were provided 
by the HYPOSTAT 2014 published by the 
European Mortgage Federation – European 
Covered Bond Council (EMF-ECBC) – see the 
webpage http://www.hypo.org/Content/default.
asp?PageID=524. The effect of the income tax 
incentive for homeowners was measured by 
a special variable – see section 1.1. Considering 
literature and data availability we proposed 
a number of the other variables which might 
explain the household debt – see section 1.2.
1.1 Construction of the Homeowner 
Tax Relief Variable
Wolswijk (2005) constructed the fi scal 
instruments variable as the after-tax capital 
costs which captured the deductibility of 
mortgage interest payment. The capital costs 
were derived from a nominal mortgage interest 
rate and amount of mortgage. Then they were 
adjusted by the relevant tax rate which refl ected 
whether the mortgage interest was deductible 
from the income tax and whether it was 
deductible fully or with a limit. The costs were 
expressed as the percentage of a house price. 
Since we assumed that individuals consider 
the mortgage interest and the relief provided 
by the income tax law rather separately when 
they make decision on borrowing we decided 
to include two explanatory variables into 
our regression model. We used the variable 
representing the impact of the income tax 
treatment of housing on the homeowner capital 
costs besides the mortgage interest payment 
as another variable.
Our key explanatory variable (the 
homeowner tax relief) was defi ned as the ratio 
of the pre-tax capital costs (CC0) to the after-tax 
capital costs (CC1):
 (1)
where r is nominal mortgage interest rate; M is 
mortgage value; TW is tax wedge.
If the ratio is higher than 1, housing and 
homeowners are subsidised by the income tax 
system. The ratio smaller than 1 means taxation 
of housing, i.e. imputed rent is taxed since it 
exceeds the mortgage interest payment. The 
difference between the pre-tax capital costs 
and the after-tax capital costs is called the 
tax wedge and it is used as an indicator of the 
extent of the tax relief on debt fi nancing of the 
owner-occupied housing (see e.g. Andrews, 
2010). The tax wedge has been calculated also 
by van den Noord (2003) when he estimated 
the real fi nancing costs of housing.
To estimate the capital costs before and 
after taxation and the tax wedge it is necessary 
to model a taxpayer who might represent the 
population taking out mortgages. There were 
two inspirations available to be used. First, 
we followed Keen, Klemm, and Perry (2010), 
who used the International Monetary Fund 
methodology, see Hemmelgarn, Nicodéme and 
Zangari (2011) or International Monetary Fund 
(2009), respectively, in order to calculate effective 
tax rates on the owner-occupied housing for 
the purpose of international comparison. We 
made the following assumptions about our 
model taxpayer: he is an unmarried person 
with no child in the top income tax bracket 
who purchased his primary dwelling for a price 
fi nanced 80% with a mortgage at a certain 
interest rate. The assumption about the top 
income taxpayer was supported by Girouard, 
Kennedy, and André (2006) according to whom 
the most indebted households are those with 
the highest incomes. The top income was 
defi ned as double the average wage which is 
the threshold of the top income tax bracket in 
the most EU-15 countries. The average wages 
data were drawn from the OECD Taxing Wages 
publications. The price of dwelling was estimated 
as 5-multiple of the top income. The mortgage 
interest rate was approximated by the annual 
average of representative interest rates on new 
residential loans provided by the HYPOSTAT 
2014. Moreover, we used the nominal rate like 
Wolswijk (2005) who argued that it is more 
relevant for individual’s decision-making on the 
mortgage. Second, since van den Noord (2003) 
calculated his tax wedge for a single earner 
couple with two children and Wolswijk (2005) 
estimated the relevant tax rate for an average 
family, we created an alternative model taxpayer. 
We modifi ed the model taxpayer’s family status: 
he is married with two children. We provide 
results of regression analysis for both single and 
family taxpayers in the section 3.
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Like Wolswijk (2005) we wanted to include 
the former 15 EU member states into our 
analysis but due to a lack of data our country 
sample does not contain Greece. We covered 
the period from 2004 to 2013, i.e. we started 
when Wolswijk ended. To calculate the after-
tax capital costs we had to estimate the tax 
wedge for every country and each year using 
effective income tax law provisions. We took 
into account the mortgage interest deductibility 
as well as taxation of imputed rent just as van 
den Noord (2003). Furthermore we explicitly 
distinguished different tax elements used in 
income tax codes to favour the owner-occupied 
housing and dealt with limits on the deductible 
amount more exactly than Wolswijk (2005).
There were different forms of the tax relief 
in the EU countries in the given period. Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands applied a deduction from income 
or a tax base. When the deduction is used the 
amount, which a taxpayer could save, depends 
not only on the mortgage interest payment but 
also on a marginal tax rate (the marginal tax 
rates were gained from the OECD Taxing Wages 
publications). Moreover, Belgium, Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands taxed the imputed rent – then 
the interest is deductible fi rst against this income. 
The imputed rent was set either as a fraction 
of the house price (i.e. for the Netherlands, 
according to the European Commission taxation 
papers) or as a percentage of household income 
(i.e. for Belgium and Luxembourg, according to 
Eurostat (2013)). A credit lowering a tax liability 
was applied in Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain and Sweden. The tax wedge 
in this case is easier to estimate because it is 
equal to the interest. There was no tax relief in 
Germany and the United Kingdom in the period 
2004-2013.
In fact we applied complicated formulas 
for the tax wedge estimations because there 
were various limits on the amounts of the 
deductions or credits. The amounts were 
usually derived from the mortgage interest 
payment as a certain percentage and they were 
mostly capped with a ceiling which somewhere 
depended on taxpayer’s characteristics, e.g. 
income. Especially, the presence of wife and 
children increased the ceiling on the credit in 
Finland, France and Ireland.
The tax wedge should be equal to the sum 
of annual amounts saved during the period of 
repaying a mortgage. However since our model 
taxpayers in all the countries were assumed 
to repay a mortgage for the same time we 
could simplify the calculation. The savings on 
the tax liability were estimated as the amount 
saved in the fi rst year of the repayment period. 
Moreover we assumed that the tax treatment of 
the mortgage interest and imputed rent would 
be stable over the whole repayment period. In 
fact, the tax treatment of the owner-occupied 
housing signifi cantly changed in Belgium, 
France, Ireland, Portugal or Spain during the 
period 2004-2013. 
Precision of our tax wedges estimates 
was infl uenced by quality of available data. 
We had to rely on information about taxation 
provided by secondary sources. We compiled 
the information from the Taxes in Europe 
database (see the webpage http://ec.europa.
eu/taxation_customs/taxation/gen_info/info_
docs/tax_inventory/index_en.htm), the OECD 
Taxing Wages publications and the European 
Commission taxation papers published in 
2011-2014. Quality of the data differed across 
countries: some countries did not provide so 
much details and sometimes different sources 
did not provide the same data about the same 
countries. 
Neither van den Nord (2003) nor Wolswijk 
(2005) included the property tax of the 
homeowner into their calculations of the tax 
wedge or the after-tax capital costs, respectively. 
We also ignored this tax on the assumption that 
there is no difference in the user costs between 
own and rented housing since the property tax 
burden is assumed to be fully borne by the 
individual using the dwelling (i.e. an owner or 
a tenant). Furthermore, Wolswijk (2005) used 
a modifi ed fi scal instruments variable, which 
included taxation of expected capital gains 
from the house sale, in another specifi cation 
of his regression model but with no satisfactory 
results. We ignored the capital gain taxation 
(the capital gain is usually tax-exempt) as well 
as transaction taxes on assumption that the 
model taxpayers do not consider selling their 
dwelling in future. After all the mortgage interest 
deductibility combined with the non-taxation 
of imputed rent are the provisions which are 
assumed to tilt households to borrowing the 
most.
1.2 The Other Explanatory Variables
Drawing from literature and checking availability 
of statistical data we identifi ed the following 
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variables which might impact on the household 
indebtedness and which would be suitable for 
the regression analysis. On assumption that 
wealthier households are able to borrow more 
money in order to buy houses we used the 
GDP and fi nancial worth per capita variables 
representing wealth. Financial worth per capita 
was defi ned as the household fi nancial net 
worth per capita to annual household income 
per capita ratio. Supposing that the unemployed 
people have limited opportunities to borrow the 
unemployment (rate) variable was added, too.
Mortgage interest payment as a portion 
of household income constituted the variable 
representing costs of borrowing in our analysis. 
The interest payment was derived from the 
annual average of representative interest rates 
on new residential loans.
Further underlying driver of the housing 
debt are house prices. We supposed that the 
prices could impact on the mortgage demand 
both negatively and positively. If the prices 
increase households have to take out larger 
mortgages. On the other hand increased prices 
can reduce demand on the housing market and 
thus a lower amount of mortgage is necessary 
to acquire dwellings. The house prices 
development was approximated by the nominal 
house prices index from the HYPOSTAT 2014 
which refl ects the changes in house prices 
observed over the given period. In addition to 
this “price” variable we included the indicator of 
the difference between the HYPOSTAT house 
prices index and the harmonised index of actual 
rents from the EUROSTAT statistics, hereafter 
the home-rent wedge variable. The effect of the 
home-rent wedge on the mortgage leverage 
was supposed to be negative, i. e. if the own 
housing price increases in relation to the rental 
housing price the amount of mortgage debt 
taken up is supposed to decrease because 
households prefer the rental housing.
To capture the infl uence of population 
structure which might determine the demand for 
housing we worked with both the young and old 
dependency ratios. Since seniors have already 
secured their housing the level of the household 
mortgage leverage should decrease with 
a higher portion of older people in population. 
On the other hand we assumed a positive effect 
of the young dependency ratio because young 
people should have a higher need to secure 
their shelter. Moreover their fi nancial situation 
presumably allows them to borrow.
Finally, since there were changes in 
measuring the data necessary for our dependent 
variable in different years for different countries 
we used a dummy variable to control for the 
time series breaks.
Data for the independent variables were 
obtained from various sources, i.e. from 
the HYPOSTAT 2014, the OECD statistics, 
EUROSTAT statistics and the ILO statistics.
Stationarity of data is requested for a proper 
calculation of p-values in regression models of 
panel data. We used the Levin-Lin-Chu test 
(LLC), assuming that there was a common unit 
root process identical across cross-sections, 
as well as Dickey–Fuller test (ADF-GLS), 
allowing for individual unit root processes to 
vary across cross-sections, in order to uncover 
the presence of unit roots in time series of data 
of the variables described above for all the 
countries in our sample. The test designed by 
Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002) was applied with 
the constant including 0 lags. The ADF test 
was done using the GLS procedure suggested 
by Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996) with 
a greater power than the standard Dickey–
Fuller approach. Moreover, the overall test with 
null hypothesis, that the series in question had 
a unit root for all the panel units, was calculated 
using the method of Im, Pesaran, and Shin 
(2003). Results of the inverse chi-square, 
inverse normal and logit tests were aggregated 
using the Choi meta-test (see Choi, 2001; 
Cottrell & Lucchetti, 2016) – fi nal results are 
shown in the last column of Tab. 1. The same 
null hypothesis (H0) and alternative hypothesis 
(H1) were formulated for both tests: H0 was 
that all of the individual time series exhibit a unit 
root, and H1 was that none of the series has 
a unit root. Furthermore if the p-value was low 
the null hypothesis was rejected which meant 
that a time series was stationary. Results of the 
stationarity tests are in Tab. 1.
The p-values showed that the fi nancial 
worth per capita and nominal house prices index 
series were non-stationary. The data for the 
fi nancial worth per capita exhibited the unit roots 
and the stationarity of these data was obtained 
by fi rst differences. The problem with non-
stationarity of the nominal house prices index 
series was solved by using data on (annual and 
relative) changes in this index which were also 
available in the HYPOSTAT 2014. The change 
in nominal house prices indices series was 
already stationary and a new variable, labelled 
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“house prices”, was set up. See the p-values for 
the adjusted series in the bottom of the Tab. 1. 
Values of the LLC test for the GDP per capita 
variable were ambiguous, nevertheless we 
decided to consider the series as stationary. All 
the other series were stationary.
Tab. 2 presents descriptive statistics for all 
the variables used in a regression analysis, 
variable
LLC ADF-GLS
coeffi cient t-ratio z-score [p-value] Meta-tests p-value
household mortgage leverage -0.303110 -8.524 -6.40937 [0.0000] < 0.00
single homeowner tax relief -0.607120 -6.050 -2.98838 [0.0014] NA
family homeowner tax relief -1.012400 -10.698 -6.9322   [0.0000] NA
GDP per capita -0.223060 -3.771 -1.18036 [0.1189] < 0.00
fi nancial worth per capita -0.021903 -0.567  1.58079 [0.9430] 0.735
unemployment -0.606710 -9.791 -5.65002 [0.0000] < 0.00
mortgage interest payment -0.231590 -4.070 -1.48657 [0.0686] < 0.01
nominal house prices index -0.092375 -2.230  0.24923 [0.5984] < 0.00
home-rent wedge -0.679620 -8.305 -5.3787   [0.0000] < 0.00
young dependency ratio -0.115020 -8.512 -7.70736 [0.0000] < 0.00
old dependency ratio -0.116960 -7.551 -6.9874   [0.0000] < 0.00
break-point dummy -0.154430 -4.144 -2.74214 [0.0031] < 0.00
adjusted series
fi nancial worth per capita (1st-dif.) -0.661910 -8.286 -4.09091 [0.0000] < 0.00
house prices (change in %) -0.495910 -7.848 -5.21249 [0.0000] < 0.00
Source: own
Tab. 1: Stationarity tests results
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev.
household mortgage leverage 0.990606 0.886642 0.190009 2.26104 0.519354
single homeowner tax relief 1.1738 1.1269 0.98624 2.6178 0.23242
family homeowner tax relief 1.2650 1.1401 0.98624 2.6178 0.34274
GDP per capita 35,193 33,462 14,534 87,231 13,302
fi nancial worth per capita (1st-dif.) 1.1167 1.0687 0.38264 2.2013 0.40244
unemployment (%) 7.81508 7.53600 2.75100 26.0920 3.79661
mortgage interest payment 0.30541 0.30469 0.11224 0.84372 0.10831
house prices (change in %) 2.5528 2.5337 -18.776 30.769 6.6330
home-rent wedge -0.26071 0.0000 -18.700 20.000 3.3553
young dependency ratio (%) 22.685 23.123 18.138 28.236 2.3741
old dependency ratio (%) 4.4620 4.5180 2.6265 6.1160 0.79377
Source: own
Tab. 2: Descriptive statistics for non-binary variables, observations of 14 EU countries, 2004-2013
EM_1_2018.indd   58 21.3.2018   12:01:36
591, XXI, 2018
Economics
i.e. the dependent variable as well as the 
independent variables.
2. Discussion of Econometric 
Methods
Our analysis was based on panels which can be 
described as balanced. There was an observation 
for every year (2004-2013, i.e. 10 years) and for 
every unit (i.e. 14 countries).
In our pilot work (see Slintáková & Klazar, 
2015a or Slintáková & Klazar, 2015b) we 
used the pooled OLS method because of its 
two advantages. First, we gained in effi ciency 
because it was not necessary to allow for 
non-existent within-groups autocorrelation. 
Second, we took advantage of the fi nite-sample 
properties instead of relying on the asymptotic 
properties of random effects (see Dougherty, 
2007). In case the unobserved effect is 
weak, i. e. there are no relevant unobserved 
characteristics, the pooled regression is 
the best method to describe a relationship 
between an explained variable and explanatory 
variables. We believed that we identifi ed such 
explanatory variables on the basis of literature 
study and the data availability examination 
that we could suppose that the unobserved 
component would not infl uence our analysis 
signifi cantly. However we could not be sure 
that there were any differences among the 
countries in our sample. That is why we decided 
to test suitability of the panel data analysis 
(see Dougherty, 2007 or Gujarati, 1995). The 
test for differing group intercept, implemented 
in the gretl software, was performed with the 
null hypothesis that groups (countries) have 
a common intercept. The test resulted with 
the following test statistic: Welch F(13, 48.1) 
= 139.847 for the single taxpayer model and 
288.331 for the family taxpayer model, both 
with p-value near zero. The null hypothesis 
was rejected and we concluded that the panel 
data analysis was more suitable tool than the 
pooled OLS method. The panel data method 
would enable to control for the different level 
of the relationship between the explained and 
explanatory variables due to different country 
characteristics.
There are two basic panel data techniques: 
fi xed effects and random effects. We followed 
the economic fundamentals (a less formal hint) 
as well as more formal (technical) econometric 
tests in order to decide which technique should 
be preferred. The less formal decision was 
based on the recommendation of Dougherty 
(2007) who, in case that an observation cannot 
be described as being a random sample from 
a given population, recommends using the fi xed 
effects. We supposed that our selected countries 
sample could not be a random sample. We 
believed that economic nature of our data was 
not compatible with the presence of random 
effects. The more formal tests of Breusch-
Pagan and Hausman were partly in confl ict. The 
Breusch-Pagan test (with the null hypothesis 
that the variance of the unit-specifi c error is zero 
versus the alternative hypothesis of existence 
of random effects) delivered asymptotic test 
statistic: Chi-square(1) = 426.747 for the single 
taxpayer and 496.52 for the family taxpayer 
with both p-value near zero. The non-random 
effects hypothesis was rejected at the 5% level. 
However the Hausman test suggested that the 
random effects estimators were inconsistent 
and thus the fi xed effects should be used 
instead. The Hausman test results are shown 
below the Tab. 3. To sum up, econometric tests 
and the nature of the analysed data proved 
that the fi xed effects would be more suitable 
method to analyse the relationship between 
the explained and explanatory variables in our 
case.
We report results from both the fi xed effects 
and random effects models in the Tab. 3 in 
the section 3. Comparison showed that the 
coeffi cient values from the fi xed effects models 
were not, in general, signifi cantly different than 
the coeffi cient values from the random effects 
models. Therefore the fi xed effects models 
results can be considered being robust.
Furthermore, since the explanatory 
variables effects might differ not only across 
countries but also over time the period fi xed 
effects were tested by Wald test for joint 
signifi cance of time dummies (H0 said that 
there were not signifi cant period effects). On 
the basis of the test results (see notes below 
the Tab. 3) we included time dummies in our 
regression models.
According to Dougherty (2007) 
a regression model can be built either from 
specifi c to general or from general to specifi c. 
On the basis of his summary of pros and 
cons it seemed that the from specifi c to 
general approach would be more suitable 
for our analysis. We devoted a lot of effort to 
study factors infl uencing the household debt 
and starting with the most important factors 
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mentioned in literature (i.e. GDP, fi nancial 
worth and interest payment) and adding other 
potentially less important factors seemed to 
be more appropriate approach. Some authors 
recommend this approach in the case that signs 
of coeffi cients are correct, see Andrews (2010).
We constructed the sequential model and we 
performed suitable diagnostic checks in every 
step. We believe that our theoretical analysis 
allowed us to cope with the problem of model 
misspecifi cation. We estimated the models of the 
household mortgage leverage with the panel data 
analysis with both the fi xed and random effects. To 
tackle the problem of heteroskedasticity we used 
robust standard errors, variant HC1 and Arellano 
approach (Cottrell, 2003). The multicollinearity 
was controlled by the Variance Infl ation Factors 
(VIF) method (Adkins, 2012). VIF values lower 
than the border value 10 (the highest value 2.2 
was derived for the old dependency ratio variable) 
indicated there was no collinearity problem in 
our set of the explanatory variables. We used 
the standard signifi cance levels and the test for 
normality of residuals based on the Jarque – 
Bera procedure. The fi nal models, presented in 
the Tab. 3 in the next section, passed all the tests.
single taxpayer model family taxpayer model
fi xed effects random effects fi xed effects random effects
const. 0.4824
(1.459)
0.3530
(1.259)
0.1670
(1.400)
0.1276
(1.253)
homeowner tax relief 0.04626
(0.09976)
0.05605
(0.1034)
0.08523
(0.06702)
0.08770
(0.06768)
GDP per capita 2.293e-05**
(3.800e-06)
2.206e-05**
(4.187e-06)
2.266e-05**
(3.330e-06)
2.199e-05**
(3.548e-06)
mortgage interest payment -0.003623
(0.1509)
-0.006298
(0.1537)
-0.02391
(0.1459)
-0.02160
(0.1463)
house prices -0.003877**
(0.001668)
-0.003618**
(0.001513)
-0.003686**
(0.001678)
-0.003536**
(0.001561)
home-rent wedge -0.005812**
(0.002663)
-0.005692**
(0.002602)
-0.005374*
(0.002694)
-0.005288**
(0.002664)
young dependency ratio 0.002328
(0.06857)
-0.004443
(0.05684)
0.009766
(0.06408)
0.01263
(0.05544)
old dependency ratio -0.09192
(0.05537)
-0.09518*
(0.04900)
-0.09762*
(0.04768)
-0.1000**
(0.04374)
break-point dummy -0.02961
(0.09297)
-0.03281
(0.09480)
-0.01960
(0.08472)
-0.02110
(0.08553)
n 140 140 140 140
Adjusted R-squared 0.7205 NA 0.7323 NA
Source: own
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * indicates signifi cance at the 10% level, ** indicates signifi cance at the 5% 
level, based on robust (HAC) standard errors. R-squared is a measure of the proportion of the variance in the household 
mortgage leverage that is predictable from our set of the independent variables. NA means that this measure is suitable 
only for linear models but not for random effects models (Adkins, 2012). Wald test results for joint signifi cance of time 
dummies: chi-square(9) = 505.436 for the single taxpayer model, 327.4 for the family taxpayer model with both p-values 
near zero. According to these results we decided to include time dummies into the models, nevertheless regression 
coeffi cients are suppressed. Hausman test with H0 that GLS estimates are consistent: Chi-square(17) = 74.0062 with 
p-value = 4.35784e-009 for the single taxpayer model, 35.8286 with p-value = 0.00483423 for the family taxpayer model. 
Robustness of models was tested by the F test for the omission of variables with H0: parameters are zero for the varia-
bles. Tests delivered F test statistics with p-values near zero for all models. Results of the diagnostic residual tests are 
presented only for our fi xed effects models. Test for normality of residual: chi-square(2) = 6.84189 for the single taxpayer 
model, 5.57706 for the family taxpayer model with both p-values > 0.01.
Tab. 3: Regression models of the household mortgage leverage
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3. Results
Tab. 3 shows the regression models of the 
household mortgage leverage. In the second 
and third columns we assume that mortgages 
are taken out by the unmarried taxpayers, in 
the last two columns the married taxpayer with 
two children is considered as a representative 
of mortgage borrowers.
It seems that the models for the taxpayers 
with different marital status and number of 
children, but with the same income, are similar. 
Namely coeffi cients for the GDP, house prices, 
home-rent wedge and old dependency ratio 
variables are almost the same in both models. 
We guess that the analysis results are not 
sensitive to family status of the taxpayer. In the 
following text we comment on results for the 
taxpayers together. In addition we comment only 
on the fi xed effects model results because this 
model proved more suitable for the estimation 
of the relationship between the explained and 
explanatory variables (see the section 2).
Regarding our key variable of interest we 
fi nd no statistically signifi cant impact of the 
income tax provisions related to owner-occupied 
housing on the household mortgage leverage. 
At least, our key variable has a correct sign – 
the tax advantage might provoke households to 
fi nance their dwellings by debt. Moreover, family 
taxpayers exhibit slightly higher propensity for 
the indebtedness because they are eligible for 
a higher tax relief.
The preliminary analysis recommended 
excluding the fi nancial worth per capita (fi rst 
differences) and the unemployment variables 
and use the GDP per capita variable as a more 
suitable measure of the economic level. The 
GDP variable produced statistically signifi cant 
effect with a positive sign which corresponds 
with economic reasoning: a higher mortgage 
leverage is more probable in wealthier 
countries.
The sign for the mortgage interest payment 
variable is consistent with the theory on the 
relationship between the interest as a price 
and the amount of a loan in all the models. 
Nevertheless the effect of the interest is not 
signifi cant.
Coeffi cients for the two variables expressing 
infl uence of the prices of housing are statistically 
signifi cant and their interpretation is consistent. 
The negative coeffi cient for the development 
of house prices suggests that the price growth 
probably diminished the demand on the own 
housing and thus need to borrow. The negative 
effect of the home-rent wedge means that 
the own housing became more expensive in 
relation to the rental housing and therefore the 
households might prefer the rental housing. 
It could lead to the reduced demand on the 
housing market and consequently to a lower 
amount of mortgage debt taken up.
The coeffi cient for the young dependency 
ratio variable is positive, as expected, but 
insignifi cant. Moreover there is, also expected, 
a negative relationship between the portion 
of old people and the household debt. This 
coeffi cient is signifi cant but only in the family 
taxpayer model.
The break-point dummy variable for changes 
in the measuring of the explained variable data 
was included in all the models. The preliminary 
analysis of data revealed signifi cant changes 
in the methodology of the measuring of the 
household mortgage leverage and the dummy 
variable seemed to be an appropriate way how 
to handle this breaks in time series.
Conclusion
We addressed the issue of the relationship 
between the income tax relief for homeowners 
and the household mortgage leverage because 
a number of economists agree that the 
deductibility of the mortgage interest payment 
in combination with non-taxation of the imputed 
rent probably encourages households to borrow 
so much that a high debt causes adverse effects 
both on micro and macro-level.
To our knowledge the fi rst and so far unique 
statistical cross-country analysis has been 
undertaken by Wolswijk (2005). We decided 
to follow the Wolswijk‘s (2005) work but we 
used different explanatory variables, especially 
our variable capturing the income tax relief for 
homeowners was more elaborate, and data on 
a later time period. While Wolswijk analysed 
the effect of the mortgage interest deductibility 
on the mortgage debt in 15 EU countries over 
the period 1982-2003 we worked with data 
for the EU countries (except Greece) during 
the period 2004-2013. The different factors of 
concern and another time span might be the 
reasons why we obtained different results than 
Wolswijk did. Our regression coeffi cients for 
the tax relief variable were positive in all the 
models which suggests that the income tax 
relief for homeowners encouraged households 
to fi nance their housing with mortgage. This 
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outcome can be supported by the higher value 
of the family taxpayer coeffi cient in comparison 
with the value of the single taxpayer coeffi cient. 
Increased tax relief is related to the higher level 
of the household debt. Our result is similar 
to the Wolswijk‘s fi nding that households 
borrowed more when the mortgage interest 
was subsidised through the income taxation. 
However our tax relief variable was not 
signifi cant in any model estimated using the 
panel data analysis with fi xed effects, which we 
preferred to the random effects. On the contrary 
the Wolswijk‘s estimates were signifi cant.
The other factors could have impact on 
the household leverage instead. Our analysis 
revealed that the leverage was infl uenced 
signifi cantly by GDP and the price of own 
housing (measured by the house prices 
index and the difference between own and 
rental housing). Our positive effect of GDP is 
consistent with the Wolswijk‘s positive effect of 
wealth, i.e. a higher GDP or disposable income 
as well as possession of stocks could increase 
affordability of own housing or lead households 
to invest more to houses. Our negative effect 
of the price of own housing is opposite to the 
Wolswijk’s positive effect of house prices. 
According to his result the higher prices could 
raise amounts of mortgage necessary to take 
up or could provide an incentive to acquire 
a house in order to make a profi t in the future. 
The interest payment and population structure 
factors could impact the household leverage 
as predicted but these estimates were not 
signifi cant in our analysis. On the other hand 
fi nancial deregulation measures and consumer 
price infl ation had signifi cant effects in the 
Wolswijk’s models. While fi nancial innovations 
probably made mortgages available for a larger 
part of the population the consumer price 
infl ation refl ected in higher nominal interest 
rates could reduce the mortgage demand.
Since our model is satisfactory from 
statistical diagnostic tests point of view we 
cannot verify the hypothesis that the income tax 
incentive for the homeownership contributed to 
the household indebtedness (the coeffi cients 
in question were not statistically signifi cant). 
Our fi nding thus does not support the opinion 
of the number of authors who claimed that the 
tax advantage for the homeownership worked 
to encourage higher levels of household debt. 
There were the other factors which infl uenced 
households’ decision-making on whether to 
borrow for housing. On the other hand we 
can agree with those authors who think that 
the income tax provisions in favour of own 
housing are not an effi cient fi scal instrument to 
attain the goal of boosting the homeownership. 
Moreover, our results do not prevent us from 
endorsing the proposals to cut back or even 
eliminate the mortgage interest payment 
deductibility. Benefi ts of reduction of the debt 
bias in the housing taxation could be a higher 
tax revenue, because of a wider tax base or 
absence of the credit lowering the tax liability, 
a greater progressivity of the income tax, since 
the change should increase especially the 
tax burden of the higher-income households, 
and lower costs of taxation related to less 
complicated tax law or administration. However 
these conclusions were based on the analysis 
of the data for the selected European countries 
and given period.
Finally, it is necessary to admit some 
limitations of our analysis which must be taken 
into consideration when interpreting the results. 
When we constructed our homeowner tax relief 
variable we ignored taxation of capital gains 
related to a potential house sale and property 
taxation which can compensate for the imputed 
rent exemption. Moreover, the capital costs and 
tax wedges were estimated for taxpayers with 
certain characteristics. In addition, the taxation 
information we worked with were not perfect.
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Abstract
DOES THE TAX RELIEF FOR HOMEOWNERSHIP HAVE EFFECT ON 
HOUSEHOLD MORTGAGE LEVERAGE?
Barbora Slintáková, Stanislav Klazar
This article presents results of the analysis of the relationship between the tax relief for the 
homeownership and the household mortgage debt. The advantageous treatment of housing is 
provided especially by a personal income tax if owner-occupiers do not report imputed rents 
as income but can deduct mortgage interest costs. This preferred tax status is justifi ed by the 
existence of positive externalities and a desire to enhance housing opportunities available to 
citizens. However, evidence that the housing policy via the taxation achieves its objectives is still 
weak. Moreover the tax provisions for the homeownership benefi t rather higher-income households. 
Furthermore there are indications that the housing taxation encourages levered property purchases 
and thus contributes to the household debt growth. Since the household indebtedness can have 
adverse effects on households and macroeconomic performance we focused on the issue 
whether the income tax relief for homeowners that fi nance their dwellings via a mortgage does 
affect the household leverage. We constructed the variable capturing especially the mortgage 
interest payments deductibility. We employed the multiple regression and data for the former 15 
EU member countries (except Greece) for the period 2004-2013. We estimated two models for 
two representative taxpayers who vary in a family status using the panel data analysis with fi xed 
effects. From our results we inferred that the income tax relief for the homeownership might not 
have infl uenced the mortgage leverage signifi cantly in the selected European countries in the 
given period. The mortgage debt was affected rather by the economic level, price of own housing, 
mortgage interest payments or demographic structure.
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